This paper studies the overall institutional evolution of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish Republic through an analysis based on path-dependency theory. It focuses on the relationship betvveen institutions and people, first as the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, then as the citizens of the Turkish Republic, and the societal forces in favor and in opposition of change. The role of conservative tendencies as a constant impediment or a reversal force in the way of institutional evolution occupies the center of the argument. The argument of this paper would lead to a claim that the process of creating new institutions by the political elite to replace the old, traditional ones initiated in the late 18* century and radicalized by a complete transformation on a civilizational scale vvith theproclamation of the republic in 1923 will be finalized vvith the future European integration of Turkey.
Introduction: Laying down the theory and the questions
North defines institutions as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, which consequently structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. He further asserts that institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change.
1
The agent is the individual responding to the incentives embodied in the institutional framevvork and the institutions evolve över time defıning the overall historical path of change.
The significant point North emphasizes is that institutional change is overvvhelmingly incremental. To illustrate this point, he considers the demişe of feudalism and manorialism in Europe that consisted of a gradual restructuring of a framevvork in which the interconnections between formal and informal constraints and enforcement characteristics evolved över centuries. The changes that altered the feudal structure were interwoven över a long period with changes at other margins as a consequence of e.g. population decline. Thus the informal constraints, customs of the aristocracy were eroded and this led to formal legal changes, such as the Statute of Wills. North again directs attention to the fact that the changes vvere an aggregation of literally thousands of specific small alterations in agreements between lords and serfs, which in total made for fundamental institutional change.
The important question regarding the objective of this paper is what happens in the absence of persistent societal forces that initiated and continued the aggregation of thousands of specific small alterations, which led to the fundamental institutional changes in Europe över a time span of almost five centuries? Thus was the situation of the Ottoman Empire, which formed a momentous legacy for the Turkish Republic that succeeded it. The first part will be devoted to the analysis of this question and its possible answer. The second part will look at the inefficiency of the Turkish political market and the distortion of the path in accordance with the theory. The other question that this paper aims to rise is as of today how this 'For detaıled analysis, see, C. Douglass, North, institutions, institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990. particular situation serves or stili hunts the democratic development of Turkey to the European Union standards.
The Ottoman Political Thought and the Discontinuity of the Institutional Change
The theory of path-dependent institutional evolution of societies treats vvars, revolutions, conquests, and natural disasters as sources of discontinuous institutional change, vvhich vvould othervvise be a continuous and smooth process.
2 Yet, North explains that by discontinuous change, he means a radical change in the formal rules, usually as a result of a conquest or revolution. Formal and informal political institutions can/cannot provide a hospitable framevvork for evolutionary change. If such an institutional framevvork has not evolved, the parties to an exchange may not have a framevvork to settle disputes, and thus may attempt to break out of the deadlock by violent means. Even vvhen change in formal institutions is achieved, the informal institutions may not change and continue to exert their existence as constraints creating an irresolvable tension betvveen the formal and the informal rules. The relationship betvveen the new formal rules and prevailing informal ones vvill be self-consistent but their tension vvill ameliorate their intra-inconsistency since the informal constraints, vvhich had gradually evolved as extensions of previous formal rules, vvill stili persist.
In this context, it is safe to assume that the decline in the medieval Turkish economy vvas caused by the same factors that had affected the West. Hovvever, this decline vvas not follovved by the emergence of nevv economic forces and institutions, and consequently political ones, as had been the case in Western Europe 3 . The difference ovves itself to a radical dissimilarity betvveen the societal forces of the tvvo and their political evolution.
Before we begin to explore and analyze the abovementioned difference and the institutional evolution of the Ottoman society, it will be illuminating to understand the first of the vital existentialist concepts of authority in the struggle between the traditional conservatives and the reformists.
The word "secular", meaning "the temporal vvorld", has been used in the Protestant countries while the policy of secularism has been expressed by the term "laicism" in Catholic countries. Secularism emphasizes the idea of worldliness; laicism emphasizes the distinction of laity from the clergy. In Christianity, the spiritual and temporal realms vvere separate from the beginning, 4 although the relations betvveen the two varied vvith time. The church represented the lıighest and strongest authority of the spiritual matters vvhile the state represented the highest and strongest authority of the temporal. Hence, secularization or laicization in the Christian vvorld referred to the transformation and reassignment of the formal and informal institutions, most importantly the political ones, which were previously in the sphere of the spiritual, to the sphere of the lay authority. Peculiar to Christianity and its historical evolution, the establishment of a church above, or subordinate to, or parallel vvith the state constituted an exception rather than the rule in relations betvveen the state and religion. 5 In islam there vvere no such concepts of church and state as specifically religious and political institutions because religion and state were fused together. The church vvas not above, or subordinate to, or parallel with the state; the religion was the essence of the state, and the state vvas the embodiment of the religion. 6 Hence, the conflict vvas not betvveen the church and the state as it vvas in Europe prior to the Reformation rather it vvas betvveen the forces of tradition, vvhich promoted and vvas promoted by religion and Shari' a, and the forces of change.
In the non-secular or traditionalist system, there is no room for the idea of change through the agency of state or any organ of society or individuals, vvhether by legislative or by other means independent 4 'Render onto Caesar what is his, render unto God what is His.' -'Berkes, Development of Secularism, in Turkey, Ibid.The State vvas by defınition founded on religion (by Muhammad or by the fourCaliphs).
of the fixed traditional prescriptions. On the other hand, rational behavior, as the epitome of secularism, is the most prevalent condition manifest in economic and scientific behavior, vvhich invalidates the sanction of religion and leads to the emancipation of political institutions.
The differences in institutions and hierarchies vvithin the religion formed the base of the distinction betvveen the Christian and Islamic experience of religious and political authorities. "Secularism vvithin Christendom came in its real sense, not vvith separation of state and church, but vvith the collapse of the medieval concept of society". 7 The political, economic, cultural and scientific institutions of the nevv secular view of society vvere overvvhelming and produced follovving the separation of church and state vvithin Christian vvorld. What is important here is the fact that these formal and informal changes rooted in the society över a long span of time came about vvith the collapse of the medieval organization of society, and that there vvas no secularism as long as the medieval concept was the defîning concept for the society despite the fact that, as previously noted, in Christianity, the church and the state existed side by side. Thus, it is hardly vvithout historical evidence, that in a society governed by a tradition, vvhich carries the sanction of Islamic rule, secularization will involve upheavals and an irresolvable tension quite in connection vvith the path dependency theory.
In islam, the lavv precedes the state as the main principle of guidance for social cohesion. The lavv, Shari' a, based on the Koran, is the ultimate source according to vvhich the political organization, taxation and the militancy issues are determined for the Müslim believers that constitute the vvhole as a community. Hence, the theory does not derive itself from a lay ethics but from the religious dicta of the Koran, and becomes a principle of unity that is personified by Allah (God). The tvvo products of this theory are: The idea of a contract of society has a much more restricted substratum in Islamic theory compared to Greek, Roman, medieval Christian and finally modern Western thought; the Islamic conception of natural lavv differs from the Western conception, even from the medieval Christian conception. In the West, the distinction existed betvveen natural lavv as the will of the divinity and natural law as an order of things existing independently of the will of the divinity with again divinity's will and wish. Although Aristotle did not explore the problem of the originator of the order of nature and only asserted that the universe always existed, even St. Thomas provided the ultimate base for a belief in the autonomy of nature, which made the secularization of natural law possible. Furthermore, the underlying ancient Greek conception of natural law, e.g., in Heraclitus, was the idea of a common natural source of laws and physical motion. Accordingly, Roman theory of natural law, e.g. in Cicero, was the product "not of opinion" but of a "certain innate force", which was "a part of a world of self-moving things".
8 These conceptions found their grounds more firmly in Galileo and a law of nature unfolding itself vvithout the active intervention of God, which meant the use of reason and rationality.
On the contrary, Islamic natural law could only be conceived as the very presence of God. This is obvious in the overriding acceptance of Gazali in opposition to Ibn Rushd's attempt to allow for the idea of a self-moving nature. This comprehension bore the idea that the law of universe that is the law of God could not be captured by the mere use of reason. Even in Ibn Khaldun, who attempted to introduce the idea of regularity of social occurrences in Islamic thought, the use of reason in politics is taken with suspicion. Once more, due to the fact that the basis of the Islamic theory derived itself from the dicta of Koran rather than vvorldly ethics, islam divulged that a foundation of the Islamic social polity was made on the basis of a compact of agreement in which the parties to it were in no way on equal standing, meaning it was a compact of submission in accordance with Allah's covenant with man.
9 This nature of "contract" formed the very nature ^Şerif, Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 88. ^Mardin, ibid., states: "Indeed, the first agreement arrived at between man and God was one which related to man's acceptance of his condition of slavery vis-â-vis God". He further details that paradoxically this primeval obligation of man to God was also the basis of man's absolute liberty in this world, for "men are free to observe or to violate the terms of this agreement". Moreover, this agreement, placing in men the freedom of using things of this world puts him in a superior position to that of ali other creatures. Stili, the agreement makes only a hierarchical arrangement and limitation of liberty, creating a condition of slavery for man vis-â-of the institutional evolution complementary vvith the absence of property rights and persistent societal forces. The inherent understanding of the contract also lies at the core of the explanation for the lack of development of property rights' and societal forces "frombelovv".
Although Koran acted as the brake on the Islamic theorists, there vvere stili other sources such as the "Sunna", the practice of the prophet Mohammed, the "Idjma", consensus of the Islamic community, and the agreement of the Islamic jurists on a principle deduced from these sources. Yet, vvithin the restriction of the unchangeable natural lavv, the Islamic jurists devised; "a theory of representation, vvhich introduced a temporal element into the political theory of islam; a conception of natural rights, vvhich came close to medieval Western theories of natural rights; and, fınally, a method of gauging legitimacy that vvas a timid step in the direction of an embryonic theory of resistance".
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The backgrouııd for secular lavvmaking in the Ottomans, on the other hand, vvas set by the Islamic conception of "Urf", the theory, vvhich stated that vvhere Shari 'a did not specifically provide a solution to a problem, "necessity" and "reason" could be used. Yet, the developments of the 13 th century resulted in the equation, by the "Ulema", of the use of secular lavv vvith the most tyrannical of absolutist rule. These developments vvere the result of the invasion of the Mongols, vvho regulated their social life by means of secular lavv. Stili, although the Ulema had an increasingly strong position in time, the Ottoman Sultans, in accordance vvith age-old traditions, had quite large space to practice lavv vvhich vvas regarded as "extra-Ser'î". This vis God, and the basis of man's liberty remains man's obligation to God. This submission should be kept in mind especially in understanding the loyalty to the Sultan and the state, which prevailed in even the modemizers of the empire and the founding fathers of the republic such as Rauf and Ali Fuad. In Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, although he definitely rejects any form of loyalty to the Sultan or Sultanate, the idea of "submission" remains in the idea of "loyalty to the republic" and exists as the principle of unity in the republican era. 10 Mardin, Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, p. 91. can be argued to have contributed to the realization of the prospect of secularization.
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The tension created by the Ulema's being at a loss with and even hostile to this imperial prerogative as a result of their education, vvhich stated firmly that there vvas no lavv above divine lavv, vvould lead to the ultimate duality in the state governance, vvhich vvould be accentuated över time vvith the modernization appeals and impacts. This effort of change vvould be taken by the Ulema as a most vital threat to the "harmony of the vvhole", rather than as a solid basis for the rationalization and secularization of the polity, and vvould play against the reformist Sultans of the declining era of the empire.
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Institutional Evolution of the Ottoman Empire
The decline of the empire, vvhich began to shovv its fırst symptoms in the 17 ,h century, requires a historical analysis. The reasons vvere many and complex composing of political, military, social and economic factors. For the purpose of this paper, its effects only on institutional evolution are considered. They produced tvvo outcomes: First a traditionalist reform mentality; later a modernist reform mentality. After the failure of the first, the latter vvas the result of the realization and conviction that the only vvay to salvage the unity of the empire vvas through a societal reformation. The pertinent aspect of the evolution to the theory of path-dependency argument is that the evolution did not continuously come from "belovv" (the society), due to the lack of coherent and persistent societal forces, but rather vvas implemented from "above" (the state administration) due to the desire fırst, to bring back the glorious days of the early years, later on, simply, to survive the nevv ages. The ansvvers of tvvo questions vvill lay dovvn the basis of this particular vvay of change: Why vvas there an absence of persistent social forces and institutions to initiate change? Why vvas the empire so late to recognize the decay and take action? n Ibid. l^This point is relevant for the Young Ottoman reformists' confusion. Since the main objective vvas to maintain the harmony and unity of the empire, they vvould be misled in their means of achieving the harmony and unity because of the (un) conscious Islamic underpinnings of their political thought.
The Ottomans, being geographically close to Western Europe, were yet quite apart in culture and religion. 13 Europeans depicted Ottomans as a tyranny in the 16 th and 17 ,h centuries. Although this concept obviously designates cormpt and perverse regimes in Western political thought, vvith some degree of ambiguity, it is argued to have conveyed a different meaning vvhen applied to the Ottoman Empire. Tyranny certainly allovved for positive features. It implied the greatness, success and stability of the empire, regardless of the feelings that this might have invoked in the Western vvriters of the time. It also did not suggest that the Ottoman regime was illegitimate not only because Europeans treated the Ottoman Empire as a legitimate government in both domestic and intemational relations, but also because the concept implied theoretically a temporary regime and the Ottoman regime was permanent since the 13 th century. 14 With the social, economic and political changes in Europe, and the decline in the Ottoman Empire, "despotism" began to replace the vvord "tyranny", certainly expressing the backvvardness and corruption of the Oriental system 15 These images of Ottomans in the eyes of Europeans have tvvo important aspects. One is that they are essential to comprehend the Ottoman pride and self-confıdence, which, backed by the immobility of tradition, led to the indifference of the system to the dynamic changes in Europe and ultimately resulted in its "lagging behind". The other is that since European observers usually designated the empire as a tyranny vvith the absence of a noble class and the existence of arbitrary management of private property (both of vvhich are crucial in the explanation of the absence of forces to initiate the change in time), and therefore relates to our question in the very beginning.
Ottoman pride and self-confidence had intervvoven reasons. The most important of these, in terms of the illusion they later caused, seems to be deriving from religious reasons. The extent of the domination of religious rules, in terms of informal and formal institutions, över ali spheres of life and the extent to vvhich these are supported or implemented by the state is crucial in understanding the process of secularization in a non-Christian society. 16 Ottomans, regarding themselves the best servers of islam in terms of conquest and thus spreading of religion to the "infidel", viewed themselves as the "righteous and virtuous" and the "others" as the "infidels and deprived of virtue". 17 The Sultan vvas the direct representative or "shadow of God", and people vvere his blind-obedient subjects. 18 The Ottoman lands vvere, thus, not only desirable but also sacred, and the Sultan's rule vvas not only undisputable, but also righteous apriori. Thus, "the Ottoman state suffered from the paradox of being too povverful and stable to make the structural adjustments necessary to meet the challenge of dynamic and innovative Europe". 19 The social and economic changes in Europe brought about nevv trends, vvhich the Ottomans vvere neither prepared for, nor grasped. The romantic mysticism of the Orient contributed to the decline creating an illusion of superiority and a false self-confidence, vvhich became fatal.
On the other hand, the institutional evolution of the society vvas shaped by the fact that Ottoman rule did not allovv the emergence of an aristocracy vvith rights and duties tovvard the sovereign. The "tımarlı", vvho constituted a military class, did not have a base to be compared to Western feudal lords since they vvere authorized by lavv to collect the assigned tax revenue but had no specific rights to land or peasants. 20 From the very beginnings of the empire, the relationship betvveen the ruler and his Turcoman allies vvas not vvithout tension, which undermined ali attempts by the sultan for a strong state. 21 The effort on the sultan's part to lessen his dependence on his Turcoman notables resolved itself into an effort of creating a counter-force, for which the Christians of the conquered territories seemed to fit. To this end, the possibility of an independent Ottoman landowning aristocracy for which the notables could have been candidates was destroyed by the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, and with "devshirme" system in fail use, the central authority was made ever more povverful. 22 Had it been the opposite, the historical evolution of Ottoman society and politics could have followed a somewhat more similar evolution to that of Europe. Unlike Europe, however, there emerged no social force with a strong base to challenge the sultan's absolute power, and transform the society from "below" compared to that of the Magna Carta of 1215, the Enlightenment, the Renaissance and the Reformation of the 16 th and 17 th centuries, ali of which were the results of long bloody wars as well as the revival of antique Greek heritage. On the other hand, "the Sened-î ittifak (Pledge of the Agreement/Alliance-1808), far from being a Magna Carta, was one of the first steps toward the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a modern centralized state". 23 Truly, an effective impact of Western "awakening" reached the empire only after the French Revolution of 1789. By then the empire was referred to as "the Sick Man of Europe".
2 'See Ahmad, Making of Modern Turkey, for a detailed historical revievv. 22 Murat I begaıı the practice of recruiting the brightest and most talented Christian male youths to be trained in the capital. Mehmed, conquering istanbul, guaranteed this system, enhanced his central rule by countering the notables. For further details, J. Shaw, Stanford, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkey, Vol. 1, London, Cambridge University Press, 1976.
•"Mardin, Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, p. 148. Mardin also mentions that although the document itself amounted to recognition of the independence of "Ayans" (local dynasties) insofar as it did rely on their assistance, the historian Cevdet Pasa quite clearly indicates that this was a temporary compromise due to the weakness of the central povvers. It was more of an era of cooperation between the Sultan Mahmud II and the bureaucrats who brought him to the throne. Thus, although the end was atı institutional reformation and emancipation, the means required a "strong and determined" sultan to reach the end.
The Determining of A New Path; Remedies for the "illness"
The declining era of the empire is broadly characterized by palace conspiracies, reformist Sultans who initiate traditionalistic reforms, and conservative forces that reverse these reforms. The resultant confusion of duality in the path-dependent evolution of institutions and the patent tension betvveen conservatives and reformists constitute a devastating effect on the fiıture demişe of the empire as vvell as forming the preliminary basis of the future Western path. The most important conservative institutions of this age appear to be the Ulema, and the Janissaries, the Soldiers of the Sultan.
The Ottoman Empire vvitnesses, in this era, the fundamentalist tendency of the Ulema. The Ulema, by nature, maintained the continuity of lavv and tradition and combated the anti-authoritarian, anti-traditionalist religious tendencies, even vvhen they manifested themselves as the antinomianism of the mystic (sufı). Members of Ulema vvere dravvn from "medreses", colleges for the education of lavv and theology, vvhich vvere inside one and other, and founded by the Sultan. Since the role of Ulema vvas the interpretation of the Shari'a vvhenever nevv cases arose, and especially if the case involved something, vvhich had special religious or political import, the Şeyhül-islam (highest ranking Ulema) assumed an almost equal povver to the Sadrazam/Grand Vizier in state affairs. Över time, vvith the fundamentalist propensity, even a seemingly insignificant innovation vvas regarded as a deviation from Shari' a, and thus vvas vievved to be leading to the destruction of "the harmony of the vvhole". Any innovation vvas prevented by the Ulema vvith the conviction that it vvas contrary to Koran, the Holy Book of islam and Shari' a, its rule.
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The Janissaries developed a no less fundamental mentality under the hold of tradition, particularly vvith the fırst military defeats of the empire and the consequent military reforms. They became actively involved in palace politics, assuming a different role, and vvith their povver, they could depose, even kili the Sultan.
Any innovation vvas discouraged if not prevented since it vvas the innovator's life at stake let alone the concepts such as patent rights. This is related to the lack of development of property rights, vvhich is the main ingredient of individual and societal (economic and political) development.
The era of reform can be argued to have started with the Tulip Era, which lasted for 12 years, following the Treaty of Passarovitz (1718). 25 The year 1727, however, saw the introduction of the idea of change and progress, and modern scientific thinking into the empire by İbrahim Müteferrika, whose interest rested in science 26 . This introduction of only a primitive form of rationalism came through printing press, vvhich vvas allovved to be used for the printing of vvhat was regarded as scientific materials. Yet, such individual attempts, because the empire lacked the institutional framevvork, the most vital of vvhich is the security of tenure and protection from confiscation, could not lead to an importunate social change.
In the modern sense, the earliest theory of reform belonged to Sultan Young Osman, vvho, at the age of 16, attempted to curb the povver of the Seyhul-Islam and the Janissaries. 27 The Janissaries killed him before he could implement his ideas. Later, an important figüre vvas Selim III, vvho founded a new Army section Nizam-î Cedit (Nevv Order), introduced significant militaristic reforms, opened embassies, engineering and medicine schools under European instruction. Selim III attempted to reorganize the empire through traditionalistic reforms, but When the Janissaries revolted in 1807, he gave in to their demands to prevent further bloodshed. The conservatives led by the reactionary Seyhul-Islam convinced him to negotiate and conciliate. Encouraged by this that they could get vvhatever they vvanted, the Janissaries, vvith their assault on the Palace, deposed and killed Selim m.
The Tulip Era, characterized by its failure of several reform attempts, the extravagance of the Sultanate at the expense of the public vvelfare and the desire to avoid vvar at ali costs, vvas ended by a brutal uprising.
Berkes notes that Mutefferrika's most significant work vvas the "Rational Bases for the Polities of Nations", vvhich presented the idea that the empire had to learn and adopt from Europe. The printing press, as a Westem innovatıon, was excluded from the arena of religion; thus could not bring a rationalization in religion. 97 Although the nature of his reforms vvere traditionalis, that is, involved no attempts to change the political system as Young Osman took a secularizing step, the whole process is taken here in the context of modernism. Later modernist reforms had an increasing tendency to eliminate the religious hold in social and political life.
Follovving the reign of the most liberal of the traditionalistic reformists, which ended in failure and defeat by the traditional forces, came the era of radical reforms. Those failed reforms in fact set the Ottoman system on a path toward modernization, vvhich vvould characterize its last century of existence.
Witnessing the results of Selim's vveakness and indecision, 28 Mahmud II realized that: '1) reforms, to be successful, had to encompass the entire scope of Ottoman institutions and society, not only a fevv elements of the military (evolutionary thinking); 2) the only vvay that reformed institutions could operate vvas through the destruction of the ones they vvere replacing, so that the latter could not hinder their operation (revolutionary thinking to form the base for evolution)); 3) the reforms had to be carefully planned and support assured before they vvere attempted (evolutionary thinking).
29 These three points vvere vital in the maintenance of the path the empire vvas put on in three vvays. First, although they could not save the empire from dismantling, vvhich vvas alvvays the prior objective, they made a historical turning point in that despite confusion and deviations from time to time, they assured a future success. Second, the points referred to the real "illness" that the empire suffered. Third, they formed the very base for the final modernist Mustafa Kemal and the foundation of the secular republic.
In accordance vvith the first point, Mahmud II started an almost svveeping reformation period that involved every institution; the Arnıy, the state administration and education. This determined the direction of the path as Western. The second point, most importantly, served to lessen the degree of effect of the most povverful tvvo institutions in the vvay of innovation and a strong modernization. It ^Mahmud was decisive in rejecting the demands of the Janissaries when they revolted and attacked the Palace. Further shovving his povver, he vvas decisive again in ordering the execution of the heir to the throne. Thus, although the conservatives vvanted to depose and probably assassinate him, he left nobody to succeed him and purged their intention. eliminated the Janissaries in 1826 30 and secularized the state to a limited extent by cutting down the povver of Ulema. Notably, the third point served the survival of the reforms and thus ali the past incremental changes gained a framevvork for formal and informal institutional changes on the horizon. Stili, the lack of an aggregation of literally thousands of specific small alterations in agreements between lords and serfs, which were initiated from "below" by the people, and in this absence, the presence of an aggregation of formal changes and attempts at informal changes, which were initiated from "above" by the Sultan did not lead to a continuous institutional evolution although its resultants were achieved ultimately by a discontinuous evolution of institutions: Kemalist Revolution.
The most momentous of Mahmud II's reforms that prepared the future institutional framework are given briefly below in terms of their effect on the Western path the empire was set on.
Mahmud II, in order to be able to embark on the reformation he planned, extended the powers of the central government and abolished tımar, the Ottoman version of feudalism At the same time, he tried to improve the apparatus through which the central government povvers were exercised, implementing such actions as ending the embodiment of unilateral policy decisions drafted by the sultan himself. 31 The insecurity of tenure and exposure to confiscation, which led to a decline in competence as well as a weakening of moral fiber, was ended despite the fact that it vvould be costly in the short run for the Treasury. Yet, in the long run, this facilitated the transaction of public 30 This incident is recorded in history as "The Auspicious Incident". Here, we see Mahmud's determination in directing history, by proclaiming the goodness of the event, which will be furthered by Mustafa Kemal's rewriting the national history in the nation-building process after the proclamation of the republic. 3 ' See Mardin, Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, Chapter V. This change is of paramount significance. Although Mahmud II was absolutistic in order to carry out the reformation project, this reform of implementing 'rule of law' indicates not only the far -reaching objective of his reforms, but also the fact that he had correctly assessed the starting point of the problem as the lack of property rights. Further, this attitude reminds Atatürk's single handedness in accordance with his use of pragmatism to achieve his ends in an absolutistic manner but for the establishment of 'rule of law'. and private business, giving civil servants and indeed to others a measure of security of life and property, which is the main ingredient of development. Further, he initiated a process, which gravely vveakened the povver of the Ulema to oppose him through diverting their revenues and through the structural and organizational regulations implemented in the government and state administration.
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Transferring the appointment of teachers and control of schools and colleges to a Ministry of Education; the appointment of judges and the administration of the law to a Ministry of Justice; and entrusting tire drafting of fetvas to a committee of legal specialists in the Chief Mufti's (Seyhul-Islam) offıce under the Fetva Emini (Supervisor of Fetva) and thus transforming Seyhul-Islam into a government offıce-holder vvith some consultative and advisory functions, vvere immense strokes against conservatism and traditionalism that had formed the most significant basis of informal and formal constraints in the vvay of the evolution of formal institutions. These steps taken tovvard a secular system is of great importance: The religion and state once existed under the auspices of traditionalism and status quo and vvithin each other vvere thus treated as tvvo separate issues for the first time.
Mahmud II's further reforms on education had tvvo motivations. One vvas his attempt for a total social change, and the other vvas to create a competent officer corps for the Army 33 . The Sultan took the revolutionary step of opening a medical school to educate in French and Turkish. With this action, he touched on a central problem of the educational and indeed of the entire reform project-the language barrier.
34 Also, opening of modern schools of science formed the social basis needed to carry out the fııture reforms. His other step vvas one of sending four students to Paris, vvhich vvould be follovved by others. These students vvould eventually play a prominent role of indispensable importance in the transformation of the country.
-^For a full discussion, see Levvis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 92-94. 33 The need for a fullfledged reform vvas first recognized for the Army due to vvhich the Empire suffered loss of territory and economic independence. As a consequence, the military officers vvere the first enlightened elite of the Empire. 34 For a full discussion, see ibid., pp. 83-89.
New governmental institutions on Western lines were created such as the Takvim-î Vakayi, the Official Gazette; a postal system, a poliçe system and entirely new ministries such as the Ministry of Finance. 35 In 1837, the institutionalized form of the Council of Ministers and a more specialized governmental organ, where the decisions arrived at during discussions vvere to be embodied in lavvs and presented to the sultan's approval, vvere established. Mahmud II's reforms had a "democratic" aspect, in the modern terminology: It had, in fact, been a vvell-established governing principle of the empire that the important political decisions vvere taken vvith the presence and advise of the state dignitaries. Furthermore, the extent of the modernist approach reveals itself better in Resid Pasha's attempts to exclude those vvho tended to "be unable to divest themselves from the manners and customs vvith vvhich the old generation vvas impregnated". 36 Thus the drive of the reformation vvas clearly Western and modernist The legacies of this period, undeniably, characterized the foundation of the republic. Another striking similarity vvould be the means sought for a future democratic formation (first implicitly, later explicitly). Although the historical circumstances vvould be different, their justification vvould remain the same due to the gap betvveen the svvift formal changes and the slovver informal ones.
Stili, Mahmud II did not stop at introducing formal, political changes but vvent on to introduce nevv formal social rules and regulations to abridge the discontinuity created by the abruptness of the formal changes and the prevalence of the traditional forces and constraints vvithin the society. He changed the official dress code for the civil servants to this end. Hence, Mahmud II, it vvould seem, "vvas See Mardin, Genesis of Young Ottoman Thoughf, Shaw, Levvis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, for details. Mardin, Genesis of Young ottoman Thought, p. 153, explains that Resid Pasha could not have reference to the idea of popular sovereignty, and specifically stated that vvhile members of similar bodies in Europe vvere elected, under the Ottoman monarchy they could only be appointed. He further asserts that this was quite a logical appraisal of a system under vvhich sovereignty had been held in trust for God by the Sultan. This vvhole system of political thought and practice that had evolved through the centuries vvould be altered by the discontinuous evolution of the Republic. not only the Peter the Great but also the Henry VIII of Turkey". 37 Yet, he vvas criticized with the argument that depriving the Ottomans of their traditional heritage, he could offer no new, coherent system of values to replace. On the other hand, from a historical perspective, it is obvious that the traditional heritage referred to vvas already dismantling vvith the erosion in the multi-national character of the empire and the severe military defeats mainly as a result of lack of innovations that brought the country under economic and social imperialism of the West.
Constitutional Monnarchy (Tanzimat Period, 1839-1878) and 'Constitutional Despotism' (Hamidian Era, 1878-1908)
The predicaments of the empire in the early 19 th century vvere many folded. The most profound effect of Western notions of nationalism and liberty vvas felt through the empire vvith a number of nationalistic movements. The empire vvas no longer able to contain its multi-national character against the explosive force of nationalism born out of French Revolution. On the other hand, it had already been both realized and accepted as a resolution by the reformers that the dual principles of the sanctity of private property and the povver sharing of the ruler vvere the underpiıınings of European political thought and recent success. Hovvever, these ideas and principles, vvhich vvere the consequences of the evolution of European society and politics, vvere stili incompatible vvith the traditional Ottoman political theory and practice.
Although the Declaration of Gülhane in 1839, to a certain extent, guaranteed individual rights for the subjects of the empire in the form of security for "life, honor and property", it neither chalienged the Sultanate nor exceeded its limits by introducing a comprehensive and novel system to replace the obviously malfunctioning Ottoman system Rather, it led the empire to an ever more confused path vvith miscellaneous ideologies and superficial restructurings. 37 Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 93. For the disadvantages and more diffıcult tasks Mahmut II had compared to Peter the Great and Henry VIII, refer to chapter4.
Gülhane Rescript embodied "the abolition and removal for ever from official documents of ali discriminatory terms and expressions indicating that any one community was held to be inferior to any other in respect of religion, language, or race. The use of such terms by officials or private individuals vvould be forbidden by lavv".
38 This appeared as a sign of an embryonic democracy due to the secularization of the Tanzimat and despite the authoritarian tone of its language. An unintended effect has been to create an impression that it had been issued under European pressure and a feeling among the Christian subjects that their salvation vvould be vvith those povvers.
The reaction in Europe, on the other hand, vvas prompt and fervent. Even August Comte decided that "the Ottoman Empire vvas the political and social laboratory of vvhich he had dreamed, alleging that the Religion of Humanity could become the guiding beacon of governmental action, for islam did not stand in the vvay of a complete remodeling of society, and the rulers had shovvn that they believed in 'energetic' reforms". 39 Yet, the declaration vvas certainly based on the groundvvork of Mahmud II, vvho died three months before it, and vvas defınitely absolutistic 40 . The declaration vvas the equivalent of a European constitutional charter only insofar as it promised that in the empire, government vvould be based on principles eliminated from arbitrary rule, although the emergence of the state separate from the Sultan, vvhich identified the state not vvith the reigning ruler but vvith established values, could be observed as early as the late 14 th century. 41 Further, though generally accepted as the peak sign of 10 J°" The emphasis on religious equality did not please everyone; some Muslims deplored it, for obvious reasons, vvhile some Christians resented being placed on the same footing as Jevvs". See Geoffrey Levvis, Modern Turkey, Nevvyork, Praeger, 1974, p. 45. 39Quoted in Mardin, Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, p.156 ^This single handedness is a common point of the Ottoman and Republican modemization projects. The state elite took on the "social engineering" due to the disorganization of the social demands and attempts for change and development. 41 In the Sened-i ittifak (1808) of Mahmud E, for instance, the state vvas mentioned instead of the Sultan as a party to the pact. In fact this has been only a counter-trend since the power vvas concentrated in the Sultan. This imperative of concentration of povver in one-hand vvas a significant factor the modernizing elite, including the reformation, Gülhane Declaration, in order to appease the conservatives, had to be backed up by the justification that it came into being to ensure that the individual, when granted security of life, honor and property, would become a more useful member of his society and devote himself fully to the state being freed from becoming preoccupied vvith his own affairs. Resid Pasha, himself, stated, tvvo years after the proclamation, that education vvas by no means so vvidespread in Turkey as to make the constitutionalism possible, and asserted that the declaration only intended to introduce a complete security of life, property and honor of individuals and regulate the internal and military expenditures of the Porte.
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The "imposed from above" changes that found their framevvork to penetrate more deeply into the society, hovvever, again, had almost no base vvithin the larger picture except the well-educated elite who spoke French and supported the so-called modernization process social engineering. In other vvords, it vvas not an imposition of the people for individual or collective rights. Largely uneducated and preoccupied vvith economic problems, people remained as loyal subjects of the Sultan, the Caliph of ali Muslims, vvith the exception of non-Muslims among vvhom nationalism and liberty vvere no longer alien concepts. Stili, ovving to the enlightened and audacious individuals vvho formed the first base of a civil society in Turkey, the Tanzimat years saw a remarkable advance of liberalism in Ottoman political thought. "In the vvorld of the 19 ,h and 20 th centuries, Turkey had to modernize or perish, and the men of Tanzimat, vvith ali their Republican, relied on. Moreover, the political parties that vvere formed as opposition to the Republican elite and came to povver in the first multi-party elections inherited the same element. This is one of the reasons why and how the party leaders appear stronger than their parties, and people tend to vote for leaders rather than parties in today's Turkey. failings, laid the indispensable foundation for the more thorough modernization that was to follow". 43 However, in the preceding era, the fate of the Constitutional Monarchy would be in shaky hands and conditions, as the following thirty years of absolutism were without precedent in Ottoman history". 44 Abdulhamid was not against the declaration of the Constitution, by accepting which he could come to the throne in the fırst place, but manipulating the ideological confusion that characterized this era and the patriotic Ottoman youth as its agents, he was able to use it for his own ends, turning away from constitutionality and assuring his survival and throne under an absolute rule. In fact, "Abdulhamid's constitutional absolutism derived its power from the constitutionalists' attempt to solve inconsistencies created by the [unrelenting] duality of state and religion in the Tanzimat regime". 45 His regime appealed to his subjects because the society had for a long time entered a period of ideologies, which the people were alienated to, after having gone through a period of bureaucracy to which the people were not adopted. The fundamental reason for this was the people's being neither bourgeois nor proletariat, but despite previous reforms, the overwhelmingly uneducated subject of the sultan with a feudal-like socio-economic system and with no effective political conscious, totally closed to the Western developments. Combined with the distressed economic condition of the country and Abdulhamid's appearance as the selfconfident Müslim ruler and above ali the Caliph respected by lands outside Turkey and Persia, vvhich were under foreign domination, created a sense of belongingness on the part of the people to the regime. Thus, neither the Constitution nor the Parliament mattered. The secular path was reversed since ali power was concentrated under the auspices of Caliphate and Sultanate.
In time, Abdulhamid organized an incredible network of spies and informers who were paid to denounce those who might be conspiring against him Consequently, the official trends of thought follovved the opposite direction that of those characterized the 43 Tanzimat. The official political thought and policy revolved around the isolationist (from the West) pillar, creating a majör disruption in the path of social and political evolution. Traditionalism, apologetics, anti-Westernism, pan-Ottomanism and pan-Islamism regained their lost grounds. However, "it is an irony that a system designated to isolate the mind from change and innovation coincided vvith the most devastating infiltration of the prohibited ideas" 46 .
One of the considerable products of concentration of povver in the Hamidian system vvas that the large bureaucratic organization became the vveakest systematic point. A rational administration could not be founded because the organization lacked the means, methods, and the personnel as vvell as being ideologically inconsistent. The inconsistency vvas in that Abdulhamid from a different perspective founded in fact vvhat the nevv agents of change (Young Ottomans) vvould perceive as the Islamic constitutionalism. This inconsistency further fed on the "spirit of submissiveness" 47 vvhich has revealed itself throughout centuries in the role of the unconditional, unquestionable and vvilling acceptance of the absolute authority of the Sultan as the shadovv of God. Even the later ideologues of the empire (Young Turks) vvere not totally free from this spirit, and could not consider, at fırst, deposing Abdulhamid. At this point, it vvould be safe to argue that Abdulhamid alone did not create this "spirit" but discovered and used it for both internal and external affairs of the state, turning it into an Islamic ideology that aimed to maintain the unity of the empire.
Ideologies of the 19 th Century and the Nevv Agents of Change:
The end of 18 th century marked the tvvo shaping concepts of the 20 th century: Nationalism and liberalism, both of vvhich vvere alien, unorthodox and dangerous for the Ottoman Empire. A nevv literary 46 Ibid, p. 276. 47 1his "spirit" will be the focal point of attention in the Kemalist revolution since M.
Kemal aimed to replace it vvith "rationality". I argue in this paper that this spirit has stili not completely disappeared but changed in time vvith liberalization and globalization effects vveakening the moral substratum of the republic. movement emerged as the promoter and defender of these Western ideas despite (and thanks to) arbitrary and paranoiac suppression of Abdulhamid. The leading vvriters, poets, journalists and thinkers of this era, in time, vvith the nevv enlightened elite of the empire, vvho vvere the fruits of the reforms of Mahmud II and his successors, formed secret political organizations. These men vvere enthusiastic, ambitious and idealist in understanding the European writings, thought, ideas and developments, and applying them to the ills of the empire. They also had the ideological and technical instruction of opposition and even revolution.
Three distinct political creeds competed at this time: Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism Ottomanism envisaged a modernized Ottoman Empire, well equipped vvith Western liberal institutions that promoted a conflict free system for the Müslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Sultan. Pan-Islamism enjoyed its supremacy in the Hamidian era and vvas in favor until vvhen Arabs preferred to become independent rather than follovv the Ottoman Caliph in the WW-I. Pan-Turkism aspired to ünite ali the Turks of Russia and Asia in one state. It vvas the last emerging ideology because of ali among the subjects of the empire, Turks vvere the least self-conscious, the least advanced tovvards nationhood, and the most confused and divided.
48 They first came up vvith the other tvvo ideologies in order to save the empire, and then realized that they vvere a separate nation as vvell vvhich could be united. Hovvever, PanTurkism vvas at least as utopian as Ottomanism, and vvould be at least as destructive as Pan-Islamism for the maintenance of the integrity of the empire.
The Young Ottomans vvere the first ideologues of the empire. The ideology of loyalty to state vvas an integral part of their scheme. Their design could be stated as "taking the best of European political institutions and placing them on an Islamic substratum". In this they vvere frustrated because the European theories of "responsible ^Indeed, to cali somebody a "Turk" was a source of insult to refer to the peasants of Anatolia; the government" had grown around theories of justified resistance and atomistic individualism, while the majör Islamic theory had not evolved an accepted theory of resistance and had not provided a theory of individualism On the other hand, their theory did not dispose one of a corporate nature of the state vvhereas the Roman theory of corporate personality bore the "Raison d'Etat" as well as the democratic product of modern theory of representation. The Young Ottomans certainly missed the point in not realizing that there existed an organic bond betvveen the political institutions of Locke and the individualistic concepts behind them. 49 At this point, a reference should be made to the intellectual history of Ottomans, which had Islamic roots and therefore reflected inadequacies in constructing a coherent, liberal system of (political) thought. On the other hand, the Young Ottoman patriotism, which vvould earn more national connotations över time, was founded on the urge to take action in the face of humiliation suffered in military defeats and policies dictated by European povvers. The emergence of the phrase "Jeune Turquie" (Young Turk) coincides with this period.
As a consequence of Abdulhamid's political suppression, the intellectual debate shifted to a cultural context, severed from the political-religious questions. 50 This, sharpened by the Western impact, helped develop the pits for a revolution combined with the cultural consciousness that the shift to a cultural context provided.
The Young Turk movement is differentiated from the earlier reformist eras with the clearly accentuated Westernist ideals and aspirations of the new generation of prominent vvriters, journalists and thinkers. The often neglected point of difference betvveen the Young Ottomans and Young Turks, hovvever, is the most momentous of ali, particularly in terms of the culmination of the principles that laid down the republic: While Young Ottoman thought had an Islamic origin, in the Young Turk theories, islam had a weaker bond. 51 This ^That is one reason why Abdulhamid was able to defeat them ideologically. Again, we are faced with the differences in the social contracts of the two societies.
^Berkes, Development of Secularism in Turkey, p. 297. ^'For example, Namık Kemal, a prominent political and literary figüre, to whom the fırst use of "freedom" and "fatherland" is attributed, had islam and Islamic law as the basis of his thought of modernization.
weakened Islamic content disappears in the Kemalist thought, the underpinning contemplation of the republican era. 52 On the other hand, although just as the Tanzimat Era vvas shaped by a vigorous Westernization effort and the Tanzimat reformers vvere sophisticated enough to tailor some Western political theories to the Ottoman traditionalist rule, and so vvere the Young Turks, the main purpose of the movement remained as the restoration of the authority of the center vvhile vvith Kemalism, the main purpose vvas to establish a nevv authority of center.
As stili a povver struggle betvveen conservatists and reformists, the modernization process embarked on by the nevvly emerged elite, by novv better known as the Young Turks, relied its survival on the very same authoritarian characteristics of the Ottoman State tradition. Again, there vvas no trace of a smooth and continuous change; despite the ideological influence of the West, the structure to vvhich it vvas applied vvas stili not related to the social and economic structure of the West. Hence, the result vvas not an evolution of the political institutions but the continuous arbitrariness of Sultan Abdulhamid, declaring the Constitution under pressure from Young Turks, and abandoning it vvhen he had the opportunity. While Young Turks vvere suspicious of the sultanate and played the game his vvay, the Sultan vvas able to freeze any social developments in his hands until the 1908 Revolution, vvhich restored the Constitution.
Despotism and enlightenment vvere the tvvo sides of the coin for the Ottomans, only that of enlightenment came through despotism, and could only survive vvith a nevv form (usually its own version) of despotism Both the means and the context of the reforms vvere, too, authoritarian, and although the absolutism of the Sultan vvas restricted for the first time, the Constitution, this time, became a gun under the monopoly of the Young Turks vvho had been politically organized as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889. The three Young Turks, Enver, Talat and Cemal assumed pivotal roles in the ruling of the country. The diversified and inconsistent ideologies of Young Turks and their suppressive methods furthered this fatal alienation, and the institutionalization of this alienation marked both In terms of ideological accumulation, a reference to two men vvill be revealing as a hint of the future path of the Ottoman Empire. One is Yusuf Akcura , an intellectual, vvho vvatched the factional struggles vvithin the Young Turks and savv that the determining factor vvould be not the union of nationalities but their ferocious struggle among themselves. In an article titled 'Three Policies", he argued that the interests of the Turks, non-Turkish Muslims, and non-Muslims did not coincide, and that the only left thing for the Turks to do vvas to forget about being Ottomans and to recognize their ovvn nationality and aspirations, just like the nonMuslim subjects of the empire had done. Akçura also recognized that pan-Turkism vvould be difficult to achieve since there vvas yet no national consciousness among the Turks, and the interests of the Turks outside the empire and the interests of the ones inside vvould also divert. 53 This streamline vvas not a common point of agreement vvithin Young Turks; hovvever, found its implementation vvith the Kemalist republic. The other man is Kılıçzade Hakkı, a knovvn contributor to Ijtihad. Kılıçzade shared the belief that islam vvas a rational, even a natural religion. This judgment vvould be the keystone of Kemalist thinking on religion, thus vvould form the most important component of the republican identity, vvhich rejected islam as it vvas, to be the base of national identity. Kılıçzade in "Son Cevap" (The Ultimate Response, 1915) Kıltçzade, hardly a representative of the nevv "political elite", stating that religion is the most effective force to control the debauched clericals, exceeds the idea of secularism in the sense of vvorldliness, but touches upon the policy of laicism, the separation of the spiritual and temporal as vvell as the rationalization of religion. His approach and language represents an aspiration that could be achieved in a revolutionary vvay. The next section will be of this revolution.
From the "Sick Man of Europe" to a "Contemporary and Respected Republic"
The Ottoman Empire under the rule of CUP led by Enver entered the WW-I on the German side. "Pan-Ottomanism, panIslamism, and pan-Turkism collapsed together vvith the Ottoman Empire on October 30, 1918", 55 vvhile Westernism, Islamism, and Turkism re-emerged. The core of the struggle, as Berkes puts it, vvhich determined the essence of the ideology of the nevv regime vvas neither a struggle betvveen nationalities, as in the Ottoman Empire, nor a class struggle betvveen capitalism and communism Once nationalism and populism vvere established in their nevv meanings, the ^4Quoted in Berkes, Development of Secularism in Turkey, p. 378. 55 Ibid, p. 431. emerging regime (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) stili had to face the mightiest of ali challenges: the question of religion and state.
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The situation vvas incomparably graver than any previous problematic era in the Turkish history vvith; the destruction of the empire, occupation of Asia Minör by the Allied Povvers and the Greek Army under the British supervision, "the clear alternatives vvere fight or perish". 57 As a result, in Western and Eastern Anatolia, spontaneous and sporadic resistance movements sprang up. These uncoordinated and disunited local groups vvere later united under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, 58 and thus emerged a historical opportunity for a hero to arise to make the radical transformation he had long ago envisioned. The Independence War vvas vvaged not only against the Allied Occupation Povvers and the Greek Army but also against the Sultanate in İstanbul, who vievved the national resistance to the Greeks in Anatolia as a challenge to the Allied Povvers and, believing that the Allies vvere bound to prevail, turned against the nationalist movement. In this, the Sultanate used the "forces of tradition" declaring the nationalists as "infidels" vvho by taking upon an impossible task, in the eyes of the İstanbul Government, vvere endangering vvhatever integrity of the empire vvas left.
"The establishment of the Turkish Republic vvas simultaneously an endeavor in state building, political institutionalization, nation building, Cultural Revolution, and far-reaching social and economic change". 59 For the Ottoman society in the early 20 th century, the "exit from the Ottoman system" vvas a most radical cultural transition. The regime transition that the Turkish state experienced in 1923 vvas one that involved and aimed a complete transformation of the political, economic and social system, an alteration of formal rules and institutions that gave the society a vvholly established historical ^6For a full examination of the developments of these ideologies among the direction in which the informal rules and institutions (that take much more longer to change) took a complimentary path with the formal ones. The regime transition was the "breaking point" of the path dependant evolution of the Ottoman society and politics. It possessed an abrupt change in the theoretical foundations of the state, and reaching the cultural roots of Anatolia by abolishing the religious foundations of the state and eradicating most of the cultural symbols by which these foundations were expressed in everyday life, it was very obvious on the structural look.
With the Treaty of Lausanne, the re-establishment of complete and undivided Turkish sovereignty in almost ali territory in the present-day Turkish Republic and the abolishment of the Capitulations, were achieved. Thus, "Turkey, alone among the defeated powers of the WW-I, succeeded in rising from her own ruins and, rejecting the dictated peace imposed on her by the victors, secured the acceptance of her own terms".
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Mustafa Kemal, took the first step of the svveeping transformation by abolishing the Caliphate, the Ministries of Shari'a and Evkaf, the religious orders (tariqas), the religious schools (medreses), and by unifying education under the Ministry of Education. The new regime was unfalteringly a secular republic. The idea of populism conceived differently from liberal and the communist doctrines was first represented by Ziya Gökalp, a prominent Young Turk, in 1918. The validity of popular sovereignty to the degree circumscribed by the post war Turkey requirements of national unity, sovereignty, and reconstruction was embodied witlı populism It meant to prepare paths of development for ali social classes, hence the nation in integrity. Through the civic idea of nationalism, national identity replaced religious identity. nationalism, vvhich recognized most of the Turkish lands dravvn in the Misak-ı Milli, excluded any idea of expansionism, Turanist and/or pan-Turkist aspirations. Civic nationalism attempted to create a nevv "Turkish citizen". Republicanism named the "child", and secured the transfer of sovereignty from the Sultan/Caliph to the "people" under the auspices of nation-state. Laicism defined the sovereignty and legitimacy of rule as one of lavv and founded the basis for a future, liberal democracy, vvhich vvas the ultimate aim of the path that the reformists of the late 18 th century put the empire on although not knovvingly. Laicism assured that sovereignty and legitimacy vvould, theoretically, not reşide in the Sultanate but in a Grand National Assembly. Revolutionarism/Reformism aimed to consolidate and protect the republican revolution against potential inside and outside attacks. More importantly, it also implied that necessary changes and adjustments in the other Kemalist principles should be made according to the times' needs.
62 A series of all-encompassing reforms vvere undertaken that reshaped the nation's history as vvell as her ideas and outlook as their reflection.
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Kemalist VVesternism
In the context of the evolution of secularism in Turkey, Kemalist Westernism and the rationalist approach to religion are the cornerstones of Turkey's formation of civic Turkish identity as the basis of its path to civilization and are relevant to the present integration efforts vvith Europe. different role in the overall social evolution as vvell as the difference in their inner evolution as a part of the vvhole are not explored in this paper.
62Atatürk envisioned the fırst of the principles to be changed över time to be his Etatism. Laicism vvould be out of scope for changeability, hovvever, vvithout vvhich the revolution vvould lose its meaning. According to F. R. Atay, in Kemal's comprehension, "the Ottomans vvere not the victims of the material superiority of the West, but the victims of that very moral superiority vvhich had given material superiority to the West. The West is an institution of freedom of the mind. The failure of the reactionaries vvas due to their identification of the "moral" vvith religion and their fear of our losing religion or nationality vvhen the question of separating the vvorld and religion vvas faced". 64 Ironically, as the path of historical development asserts, it vvas this very fear that led to first the decline, then the disintegration of the empire. M. Kemal's belief that the struggle for national liberation vvas one betvveen advanced nations and nations that allovved themselves to be exploited by their insistence on their medievalism defıned the outline and context of his Westernism His status and prestige as the "national hero" determined his drive "tovvards the West in spite of the West". Since at the same time, the political struggle vvith the traditional opposition, the Khilafatists 65 vvas yet ongoing, vvherever he toured he emphasized that the vvar for independence vvas över in the battlefield but the real struggle for independence vvas to begin only then, that is the struggle to achieve the earned place among the civilized nations, the level of Western civilization and surpass it. He also underlined that the task of rising above the level of modern/contemporary civilization vvas left to the next generations.
^Berkes, Development of Secularism in Turkey, p. 464.
Khilafatists refer to those in support of the continuation of the Caliphate. Yet, various liberals vvere also supportive of the Caliphate and/or Sultanate to remain as a "symbolic" institution. Caliphate continued to exist until the right opportunity revealed itself vvhen the segments that stili displayed "loyalty" or "submissiveness" to the Sultanate began to refer to the Caliph as a political figüre likevvise in the Ottoman Empire. Then, M. Kemal ended the duality by ending the Caliphate. The fact that the independence struggle did not rely on the Caliphate, on the contrary vvas tried to end by the Caliphate, eased the process. The developments prior to its abandonment also conviııced M. Kemal that the Caliphate vvould not coexist even as a cultural institution for tvvo reasons: First, because of the peculianty of the evolution of an Islamic society, it could not remain as only a cultural symbol. Secondly, the revolution vvas already a cultural process, vvhich anyhovv aimed to erase islam as the main basis of identity for the citizens of the republic, rather confıning the religion to the "conscience of the believers" through rationalization.
With this rationale and the follovving reforms, what the target was what Europe had achieved with the Reformation and Enlightenment in terms of mental freedom, and the separation of church and state in terms of political freedom How was this to be achieved?
If the crux of Western secularism lay in the relations betvveen church and state, the pivot of secularization in Müslim societies lay in secularization of law, particularly the Civil law. 66 The evolution of the religious institution and its legal base Shari'a, from the Mahmud II's reforms on, came gradually under the spell of secularization. The end of this evolution, which resulted in the abolishment of the Caliphate, implied that Shari'a came to an end as the law of the state because without the traditional temporal and political power, its legal and structural bases were deprived of practicality. Thus, a new Civil Code was passed, securing the legal equality of Turkish citizens regardless of race and religion as well as the complete equality of men and vvomen in regards to the inheritance and succession rights, right to a divorce through a court of law, the recognition of a mother's equal rights to the guardianship of children, and the ftıll and equal franchise for vvomen.
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The intensions of M. Kemal, did not stop at secularizing the legal and administrative system and the areas of social and economic life, but rather tended to extend into the areas of mores and informal cultural institutions in order to deepen the süper structural revolution and turn it into an evolution över a time span vvhich vvould obviously exceed his life time. Thus, vvithout losing time, he took radical steps to change the "outlook" of the people, vvearing himself the Panama hat instead of fez, vvhich symbolized the Islamic culture, and without the prohibition of vvearing the veil for vvomen, ali measures were taken to discourage it. ^For a lengthy discussion see Kinross and Berkes. 6 7 Women were permitted to vote and stand for election in municipal elections in 1931, and in 1934 a constitutional revision gave vvomen full political rights and duties.
On another area, he used every opportunity to emphasize the inherent rationality and naturality of İslam on vvhich he based his argument that it vvas not İslam but the misinterpretation of it that made the religion appear so irrational and that the religion needed a reform as vvell. Hence, islam vvould be approached through reason rather than tradition. Abolishing the Caliphate earned islam liberation from its unreasonable traditional associates and prepared the grounds for a rational religion. Hovvever, this vvas not sufficient, and the objectives vvere defined as the studying of Islamic philosophy in relation to Western philosophy, and the ritual, rational, economic and demographic conditions of the Müslim peoples. Thus, the religious reforms did not consist of a mere separation of religion and politics, and the establishment of religion out of the political and economic sphere, but rather an initiation of religious enlightenment that vvould directly involve the ordinary Turkish Müslim and transform him/her into a nevv identity vvhile at the same time leaving a place for an enlightened religion in his/her conscience for his/her spiritual vvellbeing. The struggle vvas not only över the question of separating the spiritual and the temporal, but also över the difference betvveen democracy and theocracy. Religion could no longer be implemented as the basis of the state vvhereas the nevv regime vvould accept the freedom of religion as its duty to safeguard freedom
A Pafh-Dependant Look at the Failure of institutions to Correct the Distortions of the Turkish Political Economy
North states that the result of discontinuous change över time tends to be a restructuring of the overall constraint -in both directionsto produce a nevv equilibrium that is far less revolutionary. Does Turkey possess such equilibrium?
An agreement on the ansvver to this question is extremely difficult due to various reasons. It could be argued that the reformists from Selim III on have determined Turkey's path to be Western, and the Republic sealed it. Hovvever, the old traditional vs reformist challenge, has not disappeared, and not only constitutes a majör political debate in modern Turkey in the form of Islamist vs. secularist, but also, shaping political policies, obscures the development of democracy, and hence challenges that very same path and its equilibrium This challenge is not the only division of the country although defınitely the most disturbing one. It is neither the only prolonged problem Turkey has also been unable to resolve its "Kurdish question" despite the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of PKK, since it fails to make the democratic political and cultural transition to a unity based (multi-cultural, plural) politics and society from a uniformity based (mono culture) one.
68 Political elite regards the issue stili under the effect of "Sevres complex", 69 vvhich results in a political deadlock.
The other prolonged problem is institutionalized political corruption, and lack of credible, strong political vvill and authority to end it. A resultant of the situation is an enduring economic mismanagement, vvhich seals the country's economic development and creates an endemic economic and financial crisis. It is a vvelldelineated argument that unfavorable socio-economic conditions fuel extreme political factions and anti-systemic affıliations, such as ultra nationalist and particularly in Turkey's case religious socio-political movements. 70 On the other hand, the crisis environment causes alienation in Turkey's young and more than ever vvell-educated. This relates to an extent to the lack of civil societal developments or rather to the fact that the Turkish political life had been "stabilized" by 6^F or a detailed analysis, see, Doğu Ergil, 'Document of Mutual Understanding, "A Proposal for the Democratization of the Political System and Solution of the Kurdish Problemin Turkey", Ankara, TOS AV, 1999. ^Treaty of Sevres, vvhich recognized the partition of Turkey among Allied Povvers, and establishment of an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan, vvas signed by the Sultanate and the Western Allied Povvers in 1920. It vvas never put in use, and vvith the victory of the Independence War, the Treaty of Lausanne that recognized the borders of the Turkish National Pact as the Turkish state borders vvas signed by the nevv Turkish government in Ankara and the involved Western states. The term "Sevres complex" is a frequently used concept to describe the uncompromising and emotional reaction of the Turkish political elite to demands for democratization, countering it vvith fears for survival of the state. 7 ®See S. George Harris, Turkey: Coping with Crisis, Boulder, Colorado, Westview, 1985. military interventions, vvhich suppressed the healthy development of a strong base for civil society.
institutionalized political corruption and the role of media in Turkey alleviate this situation to a dramatic extent, especially because influential media is ovvned by businessmen vvho have multiple holdings and use their sources to manipulate public opinion for their business interests. In established democracies and good economies vvhere the majority is satisfied vvith the system the rational ignorance and abstinence of voters in the elections might not constitute an alerting point vvhereas in troubled democracies, which are economically mismanaged such as Turkey, do constitute an alarming reality, particularly vvhen the dissatisfaction among the social segments of the society reflects itself in anti-systemic pressures, and the conditions better the chances of success for those pressures. This pattern of behavior is accompanied also by the political alienation of the people, vvho do not seek a radically different political regime but vievv ali the system parties as mere interest groups head över toes in corruption. Turkeys' current political developments could be examined under this light. The contention is that the high level of ineffıciency in Turkey's political market, and its persistent path due to the lack of incentive for change, lead to serious systemic challenges and disturb its path-dependent evolution tovvard efficiency.
Betz states, that "it is tempting to attribute the rise and increasing success of radical right vving popülist parties to voter alienation". 71 The same cautiousness should be given to the rise of political islam vvhich vvould also be supportive of the argument in this paper since the logical consequence vvould be that the rise of islam also has its path-dependent evolution. Yet, it is safe to emphasize that the fragmentation of polities and the rise of extreme political movements as the continuance of inefficient political markets is the underlying theme in accordance vvith the path-dependency theory. Turkey is, under the current circumstances, doomed to struggle vvith anti-systemic forces particularly vvhen the systemic forces create severe social, economic and financial crises, and the democratic and educated social segments choose to be "rationally 71 Betz, Georg Hans, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Westem Europe, St Martin's Press, 1994. p. 38. ignorant" often as their reaction to the persistent corruption. The significant point is that since both the systemic and anti-systemic forces are the main beneficiaries of this environment (lack of incentive for change), the situation is almost a deadlock.
A most controversial interrelated issue is the "military in politics particularity" of Turkey, vvhich does not allovv it to meet the Copenhagen criteria for integration vvith European Union. Alternatively, military is argued to be the vital force to prevent the rise of Islamic insurgency, vvhich as a threat to Turkey's constitutional order and regime, vvould be a significant potential source of disruption for Turkey's path-dependent institutional evolution tovvards West. Hovvever, the irony is that the military, having such a povver över civilians in the political sphere is also a source of disruption of the very same path as seen since the 1980 coup d'etat. The real problem is stili the political vacuum, vvhich "legitimizes" or "makes the military a last resort for the protection of the regime".
The 1980 coup re-introduced a combination of Turkish nationalism and islam (Turkish-Islamic synthesis) as a nevv recipe for the Turkish identity, as "The breakdovvn in society of the 1970s, vvith radical anti-systemic groups fîghting on the streets, made the military authorities, the bastions of secularist Kemalism, attempt to instill "Islamic" values into the population through the education system".
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This nevv synthesis had a striking resemblance to Abdulhamid's use of islam as a solidifying element in society, and Özal governments in the late 1980s further carried on its basic tenets. Özal's liberalism brought an expansion of the boundaries of private experience and nevv opportunities for religious organizations to market and propagate their vvares and thus their ideology. With the rise of private religious instruction, the opening of religious schools (imam-hatips) vvhose graduates entered universities, the Islamic organization has very much expanded, vvith television programs, outlets in Central Asia, such as schools in places like Samarkand. One important consequence of this religious penetration in ali aspects of life vvas due to the fact that it ali, quite paradoxically, took place under "liberalism". The "tarikats", 72 Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, p. 204 . Although Poulton takes for granted the military as the bastions of Kemalism at the time of the coup, this paper argues that the interpretation of Evren vvas definitely not Kemalist. religious orders, which were formally banned in 1925, have revived in new forms more adapted to the modern state. Islamic fashion in clothes, 73 manufacturing and music, Islamic learned journals have made islam pervasive in a modern sense in Turkish society. These were the liberal looks that islam gained in the 1980s. Hovvever, the important consequence for the concern of our paper is the fact that this has vvorked against religion becoming a private belief, making it even more communal and thus undermining the republican attempts to confine it to the individual sphere and to "enlighten" it. Thus, a strange mix of liberalism and communalism (in terms of religious identity) appeared vvhich benefited certain groups economically; pushed forvvard institutionalized corruption; eroded democratic values while supporting a Sünni islam in the public space. Poulton asserts that mass appeal of islam in the squatter settlements of majör cities among migrants from the countryside vvhose lives have been disrupted by modernization and its appeal to small businessmen resulted in the contention on the part of many secularist Kemalist elite commentators that it was a transient phenomenon, vvhich vvould fade avvay. 74 Although this observation has a truth to it, due to the inefficiency of the political market vvith corruption and other social variables aggravating it, and its persistent path, the path-dependency theory holds that the Islamic revival certainly does not convey a transient nature but a majör redefınition of social identity, vvhich the theory already treats as an expected tension. Yet, Sünni islam penetrated the central apparatus as vvell as the education system, and this rise of religion, vvhich had a seemingly complimentary role in Turkish identity, was, in time, paralleled by a rival ideology, vvhich gave islam not a complimentary but a pivotal role. 75 Although 7 There are various interpretations of "turban" (headscarf) vvhich appeared especially in universities: As the symbol of "vvomanhood" for religious Müslim vvomen as a reaction to Westem values; or simply as a matter of fashion or a personal expression preference; or as an alarming symbol of political ideology, creating a serious tension in the public space. Further, it has been portraged as a matter of "human rights". Although it has a humanitarian dimension to it, the implicit totalitarian nature of the system the Islamists propose should be kept in mind in order to assess vvhether this claim is their commitment to human rights or merely a political polemic. 74 Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolfand Crescent, p. 205. 75 Ibid., p. 185 and chapter 6.
Poulton names this rival ideology as "overt Islamization", and claims that "covert Islamization" (the rise of Sünni islam as a part of Turkish identity) should not be exaggerated, it is obvious that today's open Islamic movements are the inevitable result of the covert Islamization realized by the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, vvhich was legally and formally introduced by the military authorities of the 1980 coup, who could be argued to have shared the same observation with Poulton at the time. However, the theory asserts that covert Islamization, brought by the military and severed in the consequent Özal era, disrupting the evolution of informal institutions to catch up with the formal institutions, caused a reversal point in the history of the Republican evolutionary path that vvas to complete Turkey's transformation. In other vvords, "covert Islamization" constructed the base for "overt Islamization" as the theory suggests and as an example, the case of Iran proves in the practice.
One of the fıery troubles of modernity in the context of globalization is referred to, as the erosion of nation-state, and the relevant question is one of multiculturalism Although the nature of political islam embraces a totalitarian political theory, and the Islamists on many occasions have been clear about their ideas and feelings regarding democracy, it can stili be confusing from a Western point as the Islamist alternative involves a similar criticism of modernity and authoritarian nation/state building policies to that of postmodernism Gülalp discusses in length hovv advocates of political pluralism accept Islamism as the promotion of "civil society" since islam is an element of popular culture, and hence the development of Islamist movement is taken to be inherently democratic because democracy requires the free expression and development of civil institutions. Gülalp, hovvever, defuses this contention vvith his examination of the Islamist notion of dividing the society into communities of "faith" and building distinct legal orders for each "community" under a proposal of "multiculturalism". He further points out the imminent danger of violating the freedom of persons to live as they vvish under such a system The most important aspect is again the inherent implication that persons are not conceived as "free individuals" but "members of communities" they are assigned to according to their "faith". As Ali Bulaç, a prominent Islamist vvriter, does not refrain from stating, in a society that is conceived to be 99% Müslim the community of faith, the formal and informal rules, norms and legal framework the society would be subject to in an Islamic reorganization is nothing but an Islamist one. 76 Even this basic point makes it clear that liberalism in an Islamic context takes us to the opposite pool of Locke's liberalism and his concept of freedom of religion. Cahn notes "...toleration [referring to Locke's Letter of Toleration] makes it clear that the entitlement to practice the religion of one's choice without compromising the public peace and safety is paramount among those rights and liberties". 77 This nature of practice is secured with secularism hovvever, it is obviously not in the agenda of political islam since every Müslim will have to obey the legal and informal framevvork of his/her "community", and will be deprived of individual interpretations and consequent actions. Hence, the system will hardly resemble any kind of democracy.
In this context, are age-rotten traditionalism and the failed ideologies and the confusion of the Young Turks of the Ottoman Empire hunting modern Turkey, under the mask of democracy, in the current absence of strong and credible political leadership and presence of deep economic crisis? Is religion in state space an ingredient of democracy or a regression of society? Or stili, is it Müslim "Democrat" polities, vvhich have no intention of disrupting democracy and the constitutional order, and will peacefully transfer power after eleetions? Another vvorrisome question at this point, is, hovvever, even if the peaceful transfer vvere guaranteed, vvould the state and society go back hundreds of years under the Islamist governance for a set period of time?
Poulton maintains that one of the biggest challenges that Turkey faces today is essentially a nationalist argument över vvhat is the essence of the Turkish nation. 78 Yet, as Ottoman Empire and the republic maintained a somevvhat "geographical Europeanness", and the modernizer elite of both, added "cultural Europeanness" to it, the chief argument would be one of "progressiveness" along the evolution of the Western path or its "regression and reversal". Although Turkey is not an established democracy, 79 and has different challenges from the established democracies of Europe, there are two important similarities. One is that the extreme political stratums are not nonexistent in Europe. 80 The other is that Turkey is the only secular state vvith a Müslim population, vvhich makes it closer to "Europeanness" if it is to be defined outside the Christianity criteria. What is significant is that the momentous factor in reform attempts to transform Turkey into an "established democracy" should be the inner motivation rather than "EU pressures or impacts on change". According to Müftüler-Baç, Turkey's problems, vvhether Islamic or ethnic, pose threats to Turkey's security for tvvo reasons: "They are manipulated by Turkey's enemies and they are serious challenges to Turkish identity". 81 If so, Turkey cannot continue on "advices" or "vvarnings" from Europe for democracy: It has to transform itself finding its ovvn cures. Tanzimat Era shovved that the pinned Western notions are not sufficient although necessary to create enduring solutions, and hence result in alien structuring. Kemalist Republic shovved that an inner bora transformation is possible, and today Turkey finds itself in a crossroad to take the initiative to resolve its tensions. If Turkey fails to take this initiative, its path-dependent evolution vvill be once more and seriously disrupted.
Conclusion
It is both a historical and a philosophical argument, vvith some degree of allegory or a melancholic tone in it, that because the Ottoman Empire learned and used in its lands "matbaa", the printing press, some three hundred years after Europe, 82 it has lagged behind Europe three hundred years, and stili, so does Turkey. However exaggerated this admittedly sounds, it reflects the psychological mood of the Turkish modernists at some point.
This mental paradigm might also contribute to our argument in two ways. As from the theoretical aspect, path-dependency suggests that the tension between the formal rules and informal rules is expected and persistent when the formal rules go through an abrupt disruption to which the informal rules are unlikely to live up (considering that the formal rules again change within time, according to the time's needs). In the light of this argument, it follovvs as a natural and logical consequence that vvhat is aforementioned as a mental construct is not far from an assertion of the theory. The other point is one of a more practical issue in that if this mental state is a reality, then it constitutes a majör part in shaping the current situation and policies, as well as the future. This is not to suggest a pessimistic stand, hovvever, since the institutional evolution studied in this paper indicates a Western direction, vvhich could be complete vvith Turkey's integration into European Union.
It can safely be assumed that Turkish political culture has a personality cult aspect to it due to the historical evolution of state traditions and nation building. This has from time to time heightened nostalgia for a strong leader in a crisis driven Turkey. This and Turkey's need for more efficiency in its political economy vvill be met vvith European Union. It vvould not be an exaggeration to argue that European Union is the only institution to break Turkey's stalemate, and vvithin vvhich Turkey's historical challenges vvould be liquidated through democracy. This vvould assure Turkey's path-dependent institutional evolution as envisaged as early as the time of Mahmut II. The founding fathers of the republic built a modern society out of a medieval society, and it is Turkey's task as bestovved by Atatürk to carry out the necessary adjustments, today vvithin the auspices of a stable institution of liberty, that is the European Union.
oi See Berkes, Development of Secularism in Turkey, p. 39. The printing press here symbolizes the idea of change and progress, and modern scientifıc, rational thinking.
In the Ottoman Empire, the lack of individual rights due to the governance structure and the accumulation of deep rooted "slaveness" 83 of the subjects to the state, namely to the Palace, Sultanate or the Sublime Port, had not allowed Turkish Muslims develop "individualism" like the Western society. Even in the later stages, the elite that tried to bring Western-style institutions did not comprehend the significance of property rights as stated above until the Kemalist revolution. Under Mahmut II, we see partially recognized property rights (including tenure rights, vvhich allow people improve human capital by preventing the state to rip off fruit of their effort). Hovvever, vvidespread lack of property rights, more importantly, of the vvill to use individual rights on the part of the individuals due to their lack of self-consciousness as an individual, regular path dependence argument does not apply since there is Üıe lack of the very forces that cause the evolution. The similar tendency in modern Turkish society stili exists, not in the form of servitude to the state but in such a construct that people stili bend över, vvith hope, any formal and informal ruler other than respecting the rule of lavv.
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This is a majör problem to be explored scholarly, and as vvell to be used as developing future policy implementations in Turkey for a long-term achievement. Namely, Turkey does have modern Western institutions, vvhich can be readjusted vvithin a democratization process, but lacks the conscious and the vvill to use them as a society. That's the main question vvhy Turkey appears to stili have the spirit of "slaveness" in it vis-â-vis a personality, a ruler instead of using the mechanism that vvas provided by and left as the only legacy of the Kemalist revolution. Only then, the stream of reformist policy, vvhich had been espoused by "men of pen" since the end of the 18 th century, ^This concept here refers to the exaggerated loyalty to the Sultan/Caliph since in his person, the shadow of Allah (God) vvas reflected. Same loyalty vvas to the Shari'a as the rule of Allah. Although the Republic attempted to change this through education, the political inheritors did not grasp the point or neglect it for political benefıts. The Democrat Party that came to povver in the first elections for multi-party system had to rely on political market and median voter theorems as their legitimacy source. In fact, inönü, follovving Atatürk used a strict Kemalism as his ovvn legitimacy source. On the other hand. Atatürk did not need these legitimacy sources. In the multi-party democracy, the rule of lavv had constant blovvs; in the recent political history, particularly so in the aftermath of the 1980 coup and vvith Özal's policies.
will have found a coııtinuous base for the path-dependent evolution of the society.
Given the tendency of polities to produce ineffıcient property rights, poor economic and political performance can persist under the organizations with incentives to award redistributive rather than productive activity. This is why the polities vvith no tradition of democratic norms tend to be a politically unstable democracy, and why it is hard to reverse such a path. Yet, this vvas achieved in the Turkish case. The persistence of the inefficient path of the Ottoman rule both in political and economical terms vvas ended by a discontinuous evolution, the Kemalist revolution, vvhich ended dualism vvith both political and economic independence, and the cultivation of a "nevv state and nation". Then again, from the historical perspective that the theory claims "to matter" and "to count for the divergent paths", this discontinuous evolution vvas in line vvith the path-dependent evolution. Yavuz puts Turkey's dilemma as "modern Turkey, like a transgendered body vvith the soul of one gender in the body of another, is in constant tension...The soul of "vvlıite" Turkey and its Kemalist identity is in constant pain and conflict...".
85 Yet, one thing should be realized dovvnright: One conclusion of the pathdependent look at Turkey's evolution is that even if there vvere no Kemalist revolution, the tension vvould stili be observant because then there vvould stili be developments in favor for the evolution of the path (that first of ali, the men of pen put the society on) opposed to the then conservative and traditional, apparently somevvhat Islamic rule. This is to say that the socio-political condition of Turkey vvould be reverse but the tension vvould at a halt be there. Therefore, the tension does not ovve its existence to the "Kemalist identity" but to the forces of change and the conservative forces in opposition to it coming from the Ottoman Age. Only this time, in the absence of the revolution, the duality vvould not have ended, hence the more inefficient path of the Ottoman Empire vvould have continued in a different polity vvith ali its confusions, lagging behind the concept of "contemporary civilization" and an "established democracy". Today, in Turkey diverse political orientations, including the Islamic one, look vvith sympathy for different reasons to a future EU membership. Hovvever, the point is that an integration that would be a continuation of this path-dependent evolution should be the necessary factor and a systemic reformation the sufficient factor to become an established democracy. As Barkey notes, "this process of transition to EU is likely to force Turkey to undertake significant changes that will make the state smaller, more efficient, less repressive and intrusive and. yet, genuinely stronger". 86 These changes should transcend Kemalism and reproduce itself in the nevv milieu.
Here, it should be noted vvith caution that there are abundant events, movements and turning points in history that have played indispensable role in shaping the evolutional direction of the Turkish society, vvhich this study, due to its limits, have failed to include. As the theory contends, institutional change is overvvhelmingly incremental. Bearing this in mind, a complete and comprehensive political analysis definitely seeks a full analysis of republican and particularly present-day politics. The questions that; vvhether the multi-party system could be seen as an evolution of democracy or its regression, vvhether Turkish society is a "military" society, and vvhether the islam on the rise and the system it promotes is an ingredient of democracy or a revival of reactionarism should be raised in a complementary study.
Also because the questions stated in the introduction of this study are historical in nature, and attempted through a theory principally dravvn from economics, vvithout a supplementary study as outlined above and an analysis of Turkey's economic evolution, these questions vvill not find peace. Yet, the main intention of the paper vvas to record an historical and somevvhat philosophical summary of the Ottoman and Republican legacies for understanding the historical context, and thus providing an insight to Turkey's European integration process from an institutional evolution perspective, also taking into account the nature of political markets. Another objective vvas to familiarize the reader, to a certain extent, vvith the current situation regarding the republican path for again providing an insight to Turkey's present point in its institutional history and prospects vvithin Europe. Ali of this required a cultural and obviously historical analysis raising questions of political thought as well as of political economy. It is indeed a long and complex task to attempt to include ali points of life; cultural, political and economic, and essential as well for the overall purpose since the issue at hand is an issue of cultural identity, historical legacy, political development, economic evolution and a future insight. Hence, this paper merely attempts to indicate what is to be studied. On the other hand, how European integration vvould affect the path of evolution for Turkey vvould compose another subject to contribute to the general picture that this paper aims to offer.
